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Since Ricardo and Marx the rhetoric of inequality has been anchored to the struggle
between capital and labour. To be wealthy is to be landed, to be a rentier. To be
poor is to be landless, to be a worker. But of course there are both rich workers
and poor workers, chief executives and manual labourers, and a pensioner living
off their wealth might laugh at any suggestion of riches. In this paper we test the
relevance of the capital-labour struggle to the history of income inequality in New
Zealand. This is a companion paper to Krawczyk and Townsend (2015). That
paper derives the factor ratio and demonstrates how it is affected by changes to the
tax system.
We will refer to all capital income as rents, though more rigorously our data includes
dividends, interest, profits and some capital gains.1 We will refer to all labour
income as wages. We will summarise the strengths of capital and labour with the
factor ratio – total rents, less depreciation, divided by total wages.
It is worth exploring why an increased factor ratio should increase income inequality.
If the wage and rent distributions are the same – perhaps because people save only
to smooth their consumption into their retirement – it will not. As it happens,
capital tends to be distributed much less equally than wages (Piketty, 2014, tables
7.1, 7.2). When rents and wages are positively correlated (the top 1% of capital
earners are more-or-less the same people as the top 1% of labour earners) this
leads to a simple relationship between the factor ratio and inequality.2 This paper
examines the strength of that relationship.
Testing this relationship is challenging because we have no New Zealand data on
wage inequality or rent inequality. All of our inequality data aggregates capital
income and labour income into a single distribution. In Section 3 we regress in-
equality on the factor ratio. If the factor ratio correlates with wage inequality or
rent inequality regression results will be biased. Thus we supplement our econo-
metrics with a historical analysis in Section 4. Before these substantive sections we
discuss our data in Section 2.
2. Data used
2.1. Income inequality. Our measure of income inequality is the share of income
taken by top percentiles of earners – the top 10%, the top 1% and the top 0.1%. The
1We will refer to data in the singular throughout. See Rogers (2012) for justification.
2When capital and labour income are negatively correlated – as they were in the 19th Cen-
tury and as they are in contemporary models like Turnovsky and Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa (2008) – an
increase in returns to capital increases the income of some high-earners but not others, leading to
a relationship less easily summarised.
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study of income inequality is the study of a distribution, which no single statistic
can fully describe. As demonstrated by Atkinson (1970) this is not a trivial concern.
In his comparison of twelve countries, India is the third most equal by one measure
and the eleventh by another.
Our use of income shares is justified first by their easy interpretation. Summary sta-
tistics like the Pareto coefficient (which parametrises the distribution to a Pareto
distribution) and the ever-present Gini coefficient (which compares the distribu-
tion’s Lorenz curve to one of complete equality) lack that easy interpretation, and
shifts in them can correspond to shifts anywhere along the distribution. This means
that fundamentally different economic trends can have an identical effect on the
statistic. Percentile ratios – say, the cut-off to be in the top quintile divided by the
cut-off to be in the bottom quintile – are popular with government statistical agen-
cies, probably because they can be easily calculated from survey data.3 However
they ignore the tails of the distribution and hence they ignore the extremes which
correspond to the most visible inequality. It is this inequality – in particular the
income of the very wealthy as compared to the rest – which has been the focus of
recent popular rhetoric.4 This makes percentile ratios of limited use in assessing
contemporary inequality. Further, given the focus of this study is on the relation-
ship between income shares and the capital-to-labour income ratio it is relevant
whether a person sitting at the 80th percentile will have a significantly greater pro-
portion of her income coming from capital than her sister at the 20th. While New
Zealand data is unavailable, research from America shows that capital income only
dominates labour income in the top 0.1%.5 For the top 10% as a whole, labour
income is still 76% of total income. If New Zealand trends are similar it is dubious
whether someone sitting at the edge of the 80th percentile will have much capital
income at all.
The more expedient reason why we use income share data is that it is available. We
use data from the the World Top Incomes Database (Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty
and Saez, 2014), which in turn is from Atkinson and Leigh (2007). They calcu-
lated the share of total income flowing to top percentiles by comparing tax data
to national accounts data. Their data series is from 1921 to 2011 (though it is
punctured by missing years, and the 0.1% share only exists until 1989). In con-
trast, estimates of percentile ratios and Gini coefficients are only available from
1954 and are of varying quality (UNU-WIDER, 2014). The series developed by
Easton (1983) calculates a Gini coefficient approximately twice that of Jain (1975)
3Survey estimates of income shares with fat tails will be biased downwards unless the sample
is very large.
4Famously in the Occupy Movement’s slogan ’We are the 99%’.
52010 data, where entrepreneurial income is included as capital income. From Piketty and
Saez (2003, updated 2012).
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for the mid-sixties, making both somewhat dubious. Statistics New Zealand data
is only available from the early 1980s (Statistics New Zealand, 2014a).
For a full description of the data and its limitations, see Atkinson and Leigh (2007).
Some of their caveats are worth emphasising. As their estimates of high incomes
are from income tax data, they are affected by changes to the tax system. Quoting
a 1953 New Zealand Census and Statistics Department report they tell us that
”income-tax law is dynamic rather than static and there are few years in which
amendments, some major and others minor, to the law have not affected the statis-
tics”. Thus year-to-year comparisons are unreliable and attention should be paid
to longer-term trends. This will be relevant to our partial-differencing in Section 3.
One particularly important change is the shift from a household tax unit to an indi-
vidual tax unit in 1953. This increased our measures of income inequality by about
20%. The taxation of capital income has changed, with capital gains being treated
differently over time and dividend imputation being introduced in 1989. The in-
troduction of fringe-benefit taxation in 1985 also increased measured inequality by
inducing employers to compensate employees with salaries as opposed to ”low in-
terest loans, company vehicles or retirement income schemes”. The coincidence of
these reforms with the others of the 1980s is unfortunate.
While Atkinson and Leigh’s numerator – the quantity of income taken by high-
earners – is derived from tax data, their denominator – total income – is derived
from national accounts. Only taxable household income is included. This ex-
cludes universities, charities, life assurance funds and the imputed rent from owner-
occupied housing. The tax-treatment of transfer payments has changed over time,
with all benefits being taxed from 1986. Atkinson and Leigh include transfers in
total income in all years. However, income (both top income and total income)
is measured gross of tax. This leads to some odd conclusions. A simultaneous
increase in both tax and transfers will increase total income while leaving high in-
comes unchanged.6 Thus the policy would unambiguously decrease our measure of
inequality, regardless of its overall progressivity. This is an unfortunate implication
but is unlikely to affect our analysis as most increases in the size of the welfare
state will (hopefully) be progressive.
2.2. The factor ratio. This paper compares inequality to the factor ratio. With
the factor ratio denoted as χ (as in Krawczyk and Townsend (2015)), χ = r¯kwl , where
r¯ is net of depreciation.
We derive the factor ratio from the income measure of national accounts, for which
we have data from 1939. Data from 1972 were obtained with Statistics New
6At least assuming high earners do not receive welfare – a somewhat tenuous assumption given
New Zealand’s universal superannuation.
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Zealand’s Infoshare tool, older data was obtained from the latest revision avail-
able in the New Zealand Official Yearbooks. The adoption of the United Nations’
SNA standard in 1978 (backdated to 1972) means data before and after the split are
not strictly consistent (Statistics New Zealand, 2004b, p. 106). However analysing
crossover years suggests this problem is not substantial: in 1975 labour income
was $5762m under the old system, it was $5444m under the new system; capital
income was $3172m under the old system and $3191m under the new.7 Before the
change, labour income is ’Salary and Wage payments’ + ’Pay and allowances of
armed forces’. Capital income is ’Rental value of owner-occupied houses’ + ’Other
personal income (excluding company dividends)’ + ’Company income (before dis-
tribution)’. After the change labour income is ’Compensation of employees’ and
capital income is ’Operating surplus’. Note capital income is net of depreciation in
the first system. The second system initially published figures net of depreciation
but now publishes them gross; we have constructed net figures ourselves.
A much more substantial shift is the treatment of depreciation. Before 2000, de-
preciation was measured from tax returns (Statistics New Zealand, 2000).8 Depre-
ciation was therefore at the discretion of whatever accounting system firms used
to spread costs over time, which could be ”manipulated arbitrarily”, and it did
not necessarily account for shifts in the price level (Statistics New Zealand, 2014b).
After 2000, depreciation was measured using an age-efficiency profile, a model of
how an asset deteriorates over time. While the change has been somewhat obscured
by other changes in the national accounts, Statistics New Zealand told us in corre-
spondence that the change increased 1994 market consumption of fixed capial by
$2387m (3% of GDP) and thus decreased operating surplus by the same amount.
This change has been incorporated into the back-dated SNA standard to 1972.
Our factor-ratio series is gross of direct taxes and transfers. As the data is from
national accounts direct taxes are ignored (although net of tax figures are available
for 1939 to 1955, before the process was standardised). Transfer data is available,
either from the national accounts directly (prior to the adoption of the SNA stan-
dard) or from government spending data. Including transfers might increase the
explanatory power of the factor ratio but it would do so at the cost of disguis-
ing whether reductions in inequality correspond to government spending or more
structural change. National accounts data is net of indirect taxes.
We use the tax system to constrain inequality in Krawczyk and Townsend (2015)
so the relevance of a factor ratio that ignores tax needs justification. Intuitively, if
the gross factor ratio changes gross inequality the net factor ratio will change net
7Compare the 1975 listings in the monthly abstracts of statistics of 1976 and 1984. Note both
figures ignore the later change to depreciation described in the next paragraph and are thus not
this figures we use.
8Depreciation is referred to as ’consumption of fixed capital’ in national accounts.
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inequality. Formally, where τtop is the average tax rate on top incomes, τtotal is the
average tax rate in all incomes, τk is the average tax rate on capital income and τl
is the average tax rate on labour income:
gross income share =
gross top incomes
gross total incomes
= β(gross factor ratio) = β
capital income
labour income








β(gross factor ratio) = β
τtop(capital income)
τtotal(labour income)
≈ β τk(capital income)
τl(labour income)
= β(net factor ratio)
The approximate equality is justified where
τtop
τtotal
≈ τkτl . This will be the case when
most income is labour income but most top income is capital income. From the
theory outlined in the introduction we know that this will be the case when β is
significant. Provided τtop ≥ τtotal and τk ≥ τl we can be sure that the relationship
between gross income shares and the gross factor ratio will at least move in the
same direction as the relationship between the net incomes shares and the net
factor ratio.
Finally, no adjustments have been made to Statistics New Zealand’s treatment of
the self-employed. Conversations with Statistics New Zealand staff suggest that
this is unlikely to be an issue at the level of aggregation we are considering.
3. Time series econometrics
In this section we will formally test the relationship between the factor ratio and
inequality. As mentioned, we cannot control for the distributions of rents or wages.
If the factor ratio tends to increase with inequality in the wage and rent distributions
– perhaps because some governments care less about inequality and all its causes
– this will bias our results upwards. Of course if we think that the factor ratio
might increase inequality by increasing inequality in the rent or wage distributions
– perhaps greater returns to capital also increases the returns of those workers best
placed to use that capital – controlling for distributions of rents or wages would bias
our results downwards. Ideally, we would calculate both controlled and uncontrolled
estimates and thus infer upper and lower bounds on the effect. As we cannot do
this, we try to resolve the missing variable bias by comparing estimates for the
0.1%, 1% and 10% shares. Assuming higher incomes receive a higher proportion of
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their income from capital, we can expect a tighter correlation between the factor
ratio and the income shares higher up the distribution. However if the factor ratio
correlates more closely with wage or rent inequality higher up their distributions
this approach will still be biased.
Our goal cannot be to exactly parametrise a mathematical relationship, and we
will discuss parameter estimates in relative terms. Further, we will supplement our
parameter estimates with R2 estimates, to gauge the more modest understanding
of the basic salience of the factor ratio. Our interest in the R2 suggests we should
conduct simple regressions on only the factor ratio without including any controls.
This would bias our results if we were worried that the factor ratio might only
appear to increase because it tends to increase when, say, GDP growth increases.
But for this to be a concern we would have to be worried that GDP growth might
impact the wage and rent distrubutions, and it seems hubristic to include only some
determinants of those distributions. Thus we follow our simple tests with controlled
tests, but only to provide a rough estimate of the extent to which our estimates may
be inflated by colinearity between the factor ratio and rent or wage inequality. Our
controls when we do include them are inflation, GDP growth, nominal interest rates,
and the proportions of GDP representing the agriculture sector, the manufacturing
sector, welfare spending and other government spending. The series are generally
taken from Statistics New Zealand (2004a), extended with Statistics NZ’s infoshare
tool. The exceptions are the data on government spending from 1972, which is from
The Treasury (2014) and the most recent interest rate data which is from Reserve
Bank of New Zealand (2015).
Unsurprisingly, our time series data is serial correlated. Specifically our data shows
order one auto-correlation.9 As mentioned above, year-to-year comparisons are un-
reliable for tax data. Further, if capitalists shelter their income in companies to
smooth their income and thus minimise their liability under progressive taxation,
an anomalously large capital income in one year may be paid out in dividends over
several years. Thus our variables are more likely related in levels than in differ-
ences, and resolving the serial correlation with partial-differencing is unreliable. We
compute both partial-differenced FGLS estimates and (inefficient) OLS estimates
9Regressing simple OLS residuals on three lags gives the t−1 lag p-values 6.6e-06, 0.00182 and
0.0242 for the 10%, 1% and 0.1% shares. The t−2 and t−3 lags are not significant. The same test,
repeated for the multiple OLS, gives weaker t−1 p-values 0.0143, 0.124 and 0.103. We take the
conservative route and assume AR(1) for all our regressions.
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with AR(1)-robust standard errors.10 It is worth remembering that the standard
estimate of R2 is consistent even for serial correlated data.
Simple OLS Simple FGLS Controlled OLS Controlled FGLS








































2-sided p-values: *** < 0.001 < ** < 0.01 < * < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 1. The relationships between inequality and the factor ratio.
Figure 1. 10%, 1% and 0.1% income shares, vs. the factor ratio.
Table 1 summarises our results, with simple plots of income shares and the factor
ratio in Figure 1. All three of our simple OLS estimates are positive, significant
and able to explain a substantial proportion of the variation in inequality. This
is strong evidence that some relationship exists between the factor ratio and in-
equality. Further, as we move up the income distribution our estimates are more
significant and able to explain an increasing proportion of variation. This is what
we would hope: while inequality towards the middle of the distribution may still
be caused somewhat by wage inequality, at the extreme end much income is from
capital and so increases in their wealth will be reliant on greater returns to capital.
In fact the parameter estimate on the 10% share is similar to that on the 1% share.
As both have as their units ’percentage points of total income’, this suggests that
10Our FGLS estimator is the minimum-variance estimator derived in Prais and Winsten (1954).
Following (White, 2001, p. 3), the variance of our OLS estimator is (X′X)−1X′ΩX(X′X)−1,
where Ω is the covariance matrix of the errors. Assuming the errors ut are homoskedastic with
variance = σ2 and AR(1) with ut = ρut−1+νt, Cov(ut−1, νt) = E(νt) = 0: Cov(ut, ut−k) = ρkσ2
for k ∈ 0, ..., t− 1.
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when the factor ratio increases the income of the top 10% it is only really increas-
ing the income of the top 1%. The same cannot be said for the top 0.1%, but
their estimate is more than a tenth of the 1% parameter and thus they do benefit
disproportionately. Again, the parameter estimates should not be taken as gospel;
they are the result of both the direct effect of the factor ratio and the unobserved
endogenous effects through inequality in rents and wages. Still, this provides strong
evidence that the factor ratio matters, particularly to inequality at the highest end.
Our qualms about differencing were misplaced. The FGLS estimates are similar to
the OLS estimates. The only substantive difference is that the 10% parameter is
now larger than the 1% parameter – though not proportionately so.
As mentioned, the controlled estimates should be used only as rough estimates of
the extent to which our simple estimates might be biased. Here we can take hope
– while our estimates are now mostly statistically insignificant they are still posi-
tive and in the same order of magnitude as the simple estimates. The statistical
insignificance will largely be due to colinearity between the many explanatory vari-
ables and the eight years of missing data for the regressors. As our parameters still
have a positive sign, and demonstrate increasing R2 and significance further up
the income distribution, the controls give us no reason to view the relationship be-
tween the factor ratio and inequality as caused only by bias. We have not recorded
the parameters on the controls because they are likely to be endogenous and so
scientifically dubious. For example, despite the fairly simple negative relationship
between welfare spending and our measure of inequality discussed in Section 2, our
regressions suggest that a percentage point of extra welfare spending increases the
1% share by 0.39 percentage points. This is presumably because welfare spending
increases in response to increased inequality. We do analyse some of the controls
in the next section.
4. Economic history
Our econometrics have shown that there is a strong relationship between inequality
and the factor ratio. We will now look into the nature of that relationship by
exploring the historical context of our data, with particular regard to how it changed
in response to changing government policies.
4.1. 1945 to 1984: political stagnation; economic revolution. The post-war
economy is often derided as close-minded, unambitious and colonial. In 1950 New
Zealand was the sixth wealthiest OECD country, forty years later it would be the
nineteenth (Easton, 1997, p. 15). Singleton and Robertson (2002, p. 25) said
that New Zealand was ”dealt poor hands and played them very badly”. Whatever
truth there may be in this, in the forty years from the end of World War Two
10
income inequality dropped significantly. The 1% share peaked at 9.9% in 1953
after increasing since the War. By 1986 it had dropped to 4.9%. In 1953 the
top 0.1% was receiving 2.3% of national income, in 1986 they were receiving only
1%. Figure 2 shows shifts in the incomes shares and the factor ratio indexed to
1945=100 for easy comparison. Note that the 10% share dropped proportionately
less than the 1% share, which in turn dropped less than the 0.1% share. It seems
that the highest incomes were dragged down by the dropping factor ratio. While
the political paradigm – micro-managed economy, strong welfare state, inter-class
solidarity – barely changed, the economy that paradigm ruled was revolutionised.
Figure 2. Indexed inequality and the factor ratio in the post-war
economy.
The First National Government was elected in 1949 after fourteen years in oppo-
sition. The Labour Government before them had governed through the closing
years of the Depression and the Second World War, rapidly developing the new
political paradigm. Through the rapid expansion of direct transfers and subsidised
healthcare Labour constructed the modern welfare state (McAloon, 2013, p. 45).
By nationalising the Reserve Bank into political control and developing a substan-
tial public works programme Labour developed an interventionist macroeconomic
policy (McAloon, 2013, pp. 42-43 45). Labour made union membership compul-
sory for workers covered by the Court of Arbitration. Following a sudden drop in
exports in 1938 Labour also required all imports to be licensed (McAloon, 2013,
p. 45).11 National’s ascent into power required them to accept this new political
paradigm, thus forming the post-war consensus (McAloon, 2013, p. 77).
11Like much of the trade restrictions of the 20th Century this was more to do with wanting to
control the balance of payments than it was to do with protectionism; exporters similarly required
a government license.
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The post-war consensus was built on to a shared sense of national interest. This
can be seen in the peaceful industrial relations. Unions were mostly conservative,
satisfied to pursue higher wages through arbitration and back-room negotiation
(McAloon, 2013, p. 87). They accepted wage restraint as macroeconomically pru-
dent. The singular event of militancy – the 1951 waterfront strikes which lasted
from February to July – was opposed by the Federation of Labour, the dominant
collective of unions (Ministry for Culture and Heritage, 2014). Union membership
remained fairly constant at close to 40% of the workforce (Statistics New Zealand,
2004a, Industrial relations).
A deeper stress in the post-war consensus was the pivotal role of exporters in eco-
nomic development. In the early 1950s, Britain purchased 66% of New Zealand’s
exports and over 80% of New Zealand’s exports were agricultural (wool, meat and
dairy) (Statistics New Zealand, 2004a, Merchandise exports). New Zealand was
still a colonial economy. Leaders of the time were aware of the fragility of the sit-
uation: the reliance on a few commodities left New Zealand prone to price shocks,
and the long-term prospects for an economy built on primary produce were few
(McAloon, 2013, p. 110). These worries intensified during Britain’s long courting
of the European Community. Further, until 1985 New Zealand’s exchange rate was
fixed (first through Bretton Woods, then in the Sterling Area, then to a trade-
weighted index). This led to balance of payments crises in 1938, 1952, 1957, 1961,
1966, 1975 and finally in 1984 (McAloon, 2013, pp. 45, 89, 105-107, 109, 126,
155-157, 200). Without an independent monetary policy, forced increases in net
exports were often the only recourse. Thus for the sakes of both long term eco-
nomic development and macroeconomic fine-tuning, producers were favoured with
export subsidies (McAloon, 2013, p. 153), currency devaluations (McAloon, 2013,
pp. 131, 153 - 157) and import substitution. This trend was not without opposition
– the currency was revalued in 1973 and National had planned to phase out im-
port licensing out from the mid-seventies before losing office (McAloon, 2013, pp.
152, 153). However the regularity of crisis and disagreements between successive
governments denied the liberalisation programme any sustenance.
In 1968, the Arbitration Court took the balance of payments into account when
setting a general wage order (McAloon, 2013, p. 135)). This set the precedent for
’incomes policy’: government control over wage rates for macroeconomic objectives.
Despite ideological hesitations from both the somewhat pro-market National Party
and the somewhat pro-labour Labour party, both parties relied on incomes policies
to constrain wages they saw as inflationary (McAloon, 2013, pp. 139, 155-156).
This culminated in the government led by Robert Muldoon (neither particularly
pro-market nor pro-labour) freezing prices and wages from 1982 to 1983 (McAloon,
2013, p. 188).
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Figure 3. Post-war government spending as a share of GDP.
Source: Statistics New Zealand (2004a).
The welfare state was constructed in the late 1930s. Thirty years later the Mc-
Carthy Commission was established to review it (McTaggart, 2005; McAloon, 2013,
p. 147). Its recommendations were implemented in full in 1972, initiating the
largest expansion of welfare spending since the War. As discussed in Section 2
and at the end of Section 3, our measure of income inequality includes transfers as
income and so an expansion of the welfare state should directly reduce the share of
income taken by the wealthy, though our econometric specification did not find this.
An expansion of the welfare state could also decrease the factor ratio by increasing
the bargaining power of workers, further decreasing inequality.
Other government spending increased over a similar period. The government in-
creased spending from $635m to over $1b in the three years from 1964 (Statistics
New Zealand, 2004a). This included new spending on public works (McAloon,
2013, p. 124), potentially increasing the demand for labour and thus raising wages.
Significant public works would continue under the Muldoon Government’s ’Think
Big’ programme of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Repeating the AR(1)-robust
simple OLS estimation from Section 3 suggests that an extra percentage point
of non-welfare government spending decreases the 0.1% share by 0.06 percentage
points, the 1% share by 0.14 percentage points and the 10% share by 0.32 percent-
age points.12 These respectively decrease to 0.04, 0.003 and 0.24 when the factor
ratio is controlled for.13 While government spending may well be endogenous to
inequality, that it is a less important determinant of inequality when the factor
12The respective standard errors are 0.012, 0.095 and 0.107 making the first and third results
significant.
13The standard errors are now 0.014, 0.071 and 0.116.
13
ratio is controlled for suggests that it does reduce inequality by reducing the factor
ratio.
For 29 of the 35 years beginning 1949 the National Party governed. While they
had their differences with the short-lived Labour governments, the direction the
two parties wanted to take New Zealand was very similar. Policy was formulated in
the interests of the nation with a blindness to class. Growth was led by exporters
who deserved their government’s support. Wages were constrained, by decree if
necessary. Given this political dynamic, the sharp reduction in income inequality
cannot be attributed to any conscious industrial or social policy. While the growth
in government spending and a corresponding increase in the factor ratio is part of
the explanation, much of the change is likely more structural. As we noted above,
in 1952 wool, meat and dairy accounted for 80.1% of New Zealand’s exports (Sta-
tistics New Zealand, 2004a, Central Government Expenditure). By 1985 this had
shrunk to 47%. We might have expected that the diversification and development
of the New Zealand economy would have increased the power of skilled labour, thus
increasing inequality. This was not observed. The decline in agriculture may have
reduced the profits taken by land-owners, thus decreasing the returns of capital.
Again constructing AR(1)-robust OLS estimates an extra percentage point increase
in the agricultural sector increases the 0.1% share of national output significantly,
by 0.048 percentage points (the standard error is 0.0078). The 1% and 10% shares
are not significantly affected. This estimate decreases only slightly when controlling
for the factor ratio (to 0.037 with a standard error 0.010) suggesting agriculture
affects inequality primarily through the rent distribution.
The post-war period witnessed fundamental changes to the New Zealand economy,
even if the political paradigm those changes occurred within itself changed little.
The lack of policy change means we lack obvious shocks which would allow us to
attribute changing income inequality to either the factor ratio, to wage inequality
or to rent inequality, though our analysis of government spending does suggest the
factor ratio played some sort of important role. In sum, the economy changed,
inequality changing with it. The mechanism through which that occurred remains
largely unclear.
4.2. 1984 to 2011: government shows its muscle. Governments had a much
clearer impact on income inequality after 1984. The Fourth Labour Government
was elected amidst (yet another) balance of payments crisis. The government deficit
was high and the economy was highly regulated. The new government rapidly
reconstructed the state. The dollar was floated in 1985 (McAloon, 2013, p. 203)
and the Reserve Bank was given political independence and a strict inflation target
in 1989. Inflation sat at about 5% and was reduced to 1% by 1992 (Statistics New
Zealand, 2004a, Consumers Price Index). The State Owned Enterprises Act of
14
Figure 4. Indexed inequality and the factor ratio in the modern
economy.
1986 introduced a corporate model for state production (McAloon, 2013, p. 204).
Many of the new State Owned Enterprises were later sold. Agricultural and forestry
subsidies were mostly removed in 1984 (McAloon, 2013, p. 202). Total subsidies
were 2.3% of GDP in 1983, they were 0.5% in 1987.14 Tariffs composed 8.7% of tax
revenue in 1985, in 1989 they were 2.3% (Statistics New Zealand, 2004a, Central
government revenue).
The deregulation of financial markets deserves special attention. Between 1984 and
1986, interest rate controls were removed, the restrictions on new financial institu-
tions were reduced, capital flows were unblocked and security markets were dereg-
ulated (Abiada, Detragiache and Tressel, 2008). These reforms were implemented
more quickly than has been done in any other country. The role of the financial
sector in a modern economy is complex and thus the impact of financial reforms on
income inequality is unclear. Financial reforms might reduce inequality by allow-
ing all capitalists to get a reasonable return on their capital.15 Financial reforms
might increase inequality by increasing the returns on capital, thus increasing the
factor ratio. As Christopoulos and McAdam (2014) discuss, testing this formally
is difficult as financial reforms are rarely reversed and are likely endogenous to the
inequality present at the time. Nonetheless the New Zealand experience suggests
that financial reforms increase inequality – the 1% and 0.1% shares grew rapidly
from 1986. This is important for our analysis as it demonstrates that the factor
14GDP(I) data taken from Statistics NZ’s Infoshare tool.
15Financial reforms may remove increasing returns from capital by removing fixed costs or by
making good investments easier to find. This will reduce the incomes of richer capitalists relative
to poorer ones.
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ratio has a real impact on inequality, even when counteracted by the distribution
of rents becomes more equal.
Labour’s history as a leftist party was still obvious in their approach to industrial
relations and welfare. The 1987 Labour Relations Act broadened the areas unions
could negotiate with employers (for example over the adoption of new technology),
legalised striking and reformed the arbitration court to weaken government’s role
in dictating employment agreements (Geare, 1989, 213). Benefits were raised in
1984, 1987 and 1989 (McTaggart, 2005). These policies were forgotten after a Na-
tional government was elected in the end of 1990 and marched the reformist fervour
through to the labour market. The Employment Contracts Act voluntarised unions
and removed many of their legal prerogatives (Morrison, 1996). Some benefits were
abolished, others were cut by between 13% and 25%, and eligibility was restricted
(McAloon, 2013, p. 210). This corresponded to over $1 billion in reduced spending.
While the 10% share of income was steady through the 1990s, the 1% share contin-
ued to increase, probably in response to the labour market reforms. This suggests
that those reforms did not increase wage inequality (which the 10% share largely
captures), but rather increased income inequality by reducing the overall power
of labour. This is corroborated by the increase in the factor ratio over the same
period. Unfortunately our 0.1% series ends in 1989, but as we know that it is even
more sensitive to the factor ratio than the 1% share, we would expect that this
would have increased disproportionately. As we mentioned in Section 2, Statistics
New Zealand quintile ratio data is available for this period. Their 80/20 ratio only
increased from 2.42 in 1990 to 2.59 in 1998 (Statistics New Zealand, 2014a, BHC
series). This again suggests that wage inequality did not increase and that the
increase in income inequality was driven by the factor ratio.
Reform slowed after the National government nearly lost the 1993 election. The
Labour government elected in 1999 considered inequality as key issue – they note
in their manifesto that they would be an ”an active government committed to
reducing inequalities” (McCluskey, 2008). This was particularly obvious in their
rhetoric about inequality between ethnic groups (Clark, 2000). Labour increased
tax rates and minimum wages, moderated the Employment Contracts Act, and
introduced a series of tax credits aimed at low-middle income families(Skilling,
2010). It developed more state assets – it created a state-owned bank, nationalised
the railways, purchased a majority share in the national airline (Aimer, 2010, p.
476) and created a sovereign wealth fund (NZ Super Fund, 2014). This was no
return to the post-war paradigm; it was an attempt to moderate the new paradigm’s
reforms. This moderation has continued into the National government elected in
2008.
16
Our data demonstrates this moderation. From the mid-1990s there is no upward
trend in inequality or the factor ratio, and both have declined since 2000. Atkinson
and Leigh (2007) suggest that the spike in 1999 corresponds to large dividend pay-
outs in expectation of the election of the Labour government and the tax-increases
they signalled. While it corresponds to a real increase in inequality in that year, it
does not reflect any structural change.)
Governments from 1984 had a much more obvious impact on wages and rents and
this provides us with a much greater ability to understand whether inequality is
driven by the factor ratio. The financial reforms of the mid-1980s and the labour
market reforms of the early 1990s both suggest that it is. While wage and rent
inequality no doubt both changed significantly, our income shares – particularly
the 1% share – appear driven by the factor ratio. The quite dramatic changes in
income inequality over the twentieth century can be attributed to the changing
power of capital and labour.
5. Conclusion
The struggle between capital and labour still matters. Our econometrics have
found that the factor ratio can explain New Zealand’s shifting experience of income
inequality, particularly for inequality at the extremes of distribution. Our history
has corroborated this – though much of the inequality is the result of complex
processes which affect both inequality in rents and wages and the factor ratio,
specific policies like the post-war rise in government spending, the financial reforms
of the 1980s and the labour market reforms of the 1990s all suggest that the factor
ratio matters. If policy-makers are to take income inequality seriously they will
have to confront the relationship between capital and labour.
With the model of the factor ratio derived in Krawczyk and Townsend (2015),
they can do that. That model derives the factor ratio and demonstrates how it
is affected by changes to the tax system. In a future paper we will use viability
theory to analyse the trade-offs involved in constraining the factor ratio with the
tax system.
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